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Pascal’s Wager:  





Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), a French scientist and mathematician, 
argued that it is advantageous to believe in or to “bet on” God because 
the rewards for doing so are at least as great as the rewards for not be-
lieving in God, regardless of whether or not God exists. His decision 
theoretic argument is commonly referred to as Pascal’s Wager. It is 
unlikely that everyone has the same estimates of the rewards for believ-
ing in God or for not believing in God that Pascal had. Consequently, a 
series of five questions, based on Pascal’s Wager, is suggested here for 
personalizing Pascal’s Wager. Results from an informal survey consist-
ing of the five recommended questions are presented and analyzed. Fi-
nally, it is argued that a person’s responses to the five questions may be 
used to diagnose the person’s spiritual condition and to identify an 
appropriate evangelism strategy.  
Now there were four leprous men at the entrance of the 
gate and they said to one another, “Why do we sit here 
until we die? If we say ‘We will enter the city,’ then the 
famine is in the city and we will die there; and if we sit 
here, we die also. Now therefore come, and let us go 
over to the camp of the Arameans. If they spare us, we 
will live; and if they kill us, we will but die.” 2 Kings 7:3-
4 (NASB)  
Introduction  
The lepers at the gate of besieged Samaria in the passage 
above had a choice to make. One option was to stay at Samaria 
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and die of starvation, whether they went into the city itself or 
remained outside at the gate, because of an ongoing famine. The 
other option for the lepers was to venture to the plentiful camp 
of the enemy, the Arameans. They understood that the 
Arameans might kill them. But there was also a chance that they 
would be spared and fed. They had nothing to lose by going to 
the camp of the Arameans, so they decided to go there. Their 
decision had enormous consequences not only for themselves, 
but also for all the people of Samaria, as the rest of 2 Kings 7 re-
lates.  
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) was a French scientist and mathe-
matician. He was sickly from childhood, so his brief life makes 
his important contributions to the fields of probability theory 
(e.g., the negative binomial random variable), mathematics (Pas-
cal’s Triangle), and hydraulics (Pascal’s Law) all the more re-
markable.  
Pascal converted to Christianity on his “Night of Fire”, the 
evening of November 23, 1654, when he believed that God re-
vealed Himself to him through the Bible.2 His conversion experi-
ence determined much of the course of the rest of his life, as he 
became eager to persuade his learned friends and colleagues to 
adopt the Christian faith. He began working on an apologetic by 
recording his thoughts on religion as he had them, but he died 
before he was able to bring together and organize his ideas.  
Following his death, hundreds of Pascal’s handwritten notes 
were discovered. They were compiled and published posthu-
mously as Pensées, a collection of his “thoughts” on Christianity.3
 
Perhaps the most famous entry in this volume is Infiny-rien (In-
finity-nothing), which is more commonly referred to as Pascal’s 
Wager.  
According to Pascal, every person has to decide whether or 
not to believe in God (that is, the God of the Christian Bible). He 
argued using simple mathematical logic that the choice of believ-
ing in God, or “betting on God”, is superior to the alternative of 
not believing in God. Much like the choice that the lepers in Sa-
maria faced, Pascal thinks that a person has nothing to lose by 
choosing to believe in God.  
The Bible makes it clear that belief in God alone is not suffi-
cient for one’s salvation. After all, even the demons believe in 
God (James 2:19). To be saved, one must recognize and repent of 
his or her sinfulness (Luke 13:3, 5); believe that Jesus Christ is 
God incarnate (John 1:14) and that He died for sinners, was bur-
ied, and was raised by God on the third day (1 Corinthians 15:3-
4); and trust Jesus alone (Acts 4:12) as Lord and Savior (Romans 
10:9-10). While Pascal’s Wager does not present God’s plan for 
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salvation,4 it does provide a conversational entrée into spiritual 
matters.  
This article briefly reviews the decision theoretic argument 
of Pascal. Then, a series of five questions is suggested as a way to 
personalize Pascal’s Wager. These questions account for an indi-
vidual’s own beliefs about the payoffs or rewards for believing 
or not believing in God if God exists and if He does not. A 
breakeven probability for the existence of God is calculated 
based on a person’s responses to four of the questions. This 
breakeven probability may then be compared to the person’s 
subjective probability of God’s existence, the response to the fifth 
question. Data gathered from an informal survey using the five 
questions is discussed and analyzed. Finally, a plan for using the 
responses to the questions and the calculated breakeven prob-
ability to diagnose a person’s spiritual condition and identify an 
appropriate evangelism strategy is outlined.  
Pascal’s Wager  
Pascal knew that there is no way to empirically prove the ex-
istence of God. No one has ever seen Him (John 1:18) or experi-
enced Him with the senses. So, each person has to decide 
whether to believe in Him or not to believe in Him without abso-
lute proof of His existence or non-existence.  
Pascal believed that, if God exists, wholehearted belief (that 
is, complete trust) in God would result in a person’s experienc-
ing an eternity of infinite happiness, or eternal life in heaven. If, 
on the other hand, God does not exist, he saw no downside risk 
to leading a Christian life. He considered his own life after his 
conversion to Christianity to be a better life than that he had be-
fore his conversion. Like the Apostle Paul (Philippians 1:21), 
Pascal found his joy in Christ, even in his own difficult circum-
stances. He argued that, since there is nothing lost when a per-
son chooses to believe in God, even if it would turn out that He 
does not exist, it is prudent to “bet on” (i.e., to believe in or to 
live a life that pleases) God.5 In the language of decision theory, 
the choice to “bet on God” is dominant because the payoff or 
reward for betting on God is at least as great as the payoff for not 
betting on God, regardless of whether God exists or not.6 
Pascal’s Wager may be summarized in the following payoff 
or reward matrix:  
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Table 1. Payoff Matrix for Pascal’s Wager  
Payoff or Reward   
If God Exists  
If God Does 
Not Exist  
Bet on God  α  β  
Do Not Bet on God  δ  γ  
According to Pascal, α =∞ and β ≥γ . His argument seems to 
suggest that he thought everyone’s payoff matrix was identical, 
or at least very similar, to his own. Modifications to Pascal’s Wa-
ger that have been suggested include finite payoffs7 and recogni-
tion that different persons may have their own unique payoff 
matrices.8 Next, these modifications are considered formally.  
Personalizing Pascal’s Wager  
Suppose that every person may have unique beliefs about 
the payoff entries in the matrix in Table 1. Knowing a person’s 
payoff-matrix values may help assess his or her spiritual condi-
tion and determine an appropriate evangelism approach.  
Imagine that a person is asked to respond to the following 
questions:  
1. Suppose that God exists. What would you estimate the 
expected rewards, from now through eternity, to be for 
living a God-pleasing9 life?  
2. Suppose that God exists. What would you estimate the 
expected rewards, from now through eternity, to be for 
living a God-displeasing life?  
3. Suppose that God does not exist. What would you esti-
mate the expected rewards, from now through eternity, 
to be for living a “God”-pleasing life?  
4. Suppose that God does not exist. What would you esti-
mate the expected rewards, from now through eternity, 
to be for living a “God”-displeasing life?  
5. In your personal opinion, what is the probability or like-
lihood that God exists?  
The first four responses can be in any units (such as money, 
hot fudge sundaes, etc.) so long as all four responses are in the 
same units. These responses correspond to the payoff-matrix 
entries α , δ , β , and γ , respectively. The last response about the 
probability of the existence of God, Pr(G) , should be a number 
between 0 and 1 or a percent between 0 and 100.  
Example 1. Suppose that some person’s responses to the five 
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questions are: α= 100 , δ =−50 , β= 2, γ= 6 , and Pr(G) = 0.50 or 
50%. These responses indicate that the person believes that there 
is a significantly greater payoff for living a God-pleasing life 
than for living a God-displeasing life if God exists. If God does 
not exist, the person believes the payoff would be three times 
greater for a “God”-displeasing life than for a “God”-pleasing 
life. The worst scenario for such a person seems to be not to be-
lieve in God if God does indeed exist.  
Example 2. Suppose that another person’s responses to the 
five questions are: α= 200 , δ= 65, β =−40, γ= 100 , and Pr(G) = 
0.40 or 40%. This person believes that the reward for living a 
God-pleasing life is only about three times as great as the reward 
for living a God-displeasing life if God exists. If God does not 
exist, this person would have strong regrets about having lived a 
God-pleasing life. The worst scenario for this person would 
seem to be betting on God if in fact God does not exist.  
Notice that there is not a dominant choice in either of these 
examples. It is not clear whether the persons portrayed in the 
examples should live a God-pleasing life or not. What should 
each person choose to do? How should their choices be made?  
Breakeven Probability For The Existence Of God  
Using elementary probability theory, a breakeven probabil-
ity for the existence of God, denoted G
*
 here, can be calculated 
based on a person’s responses to the first four questions in the 
previous section. The concept of such a breakeven probability 
was suggested by Unwin;10 a procedure for computing a break-
even probability is outlined here. The expected payoff for living 
a God-pleasing life is α Pr(G) +β (1− Pr(G)), and the expected re-
ward for living a God-displeasing life is δ Pr(G) +γ (1− Pr(G)). 
Assuming that α+γ − (β +δ ) > 0 , the expected reward for living a 
God-pleasing life exceeds the expected payoff for living a God-








The breakeven probability for the 
existence of God, that is, the probability at which the payoff for 
living a God-pleasing life equals the reward for living a God-
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Suppose that β >γ. Then it is always preferable to life a God-
pleasing life, no matter what the subjective probability, Pr(G) , 
for God’s existence is. Suppose instead that β ≤γ. Then, in terms 




Example 3. Recall Example 1. For the responses given to the 




Since Pr(G) = 0.50 > 0.026 = G
* 
, 
the person who responded to the questions ought to carefully 
seek the truth about God. He or she is at significant eternal risk 
based on his or her own payoff-matrix values.  
Example 4. Recall Example 2. Based on the responses to the 




Since Pr(G) = 0.40 < 0.509 = G
* 
, a decision not to bet on God 
is logically consistent with this person’s payoff beliefs.  
Informal Survey Results  
An informal survey consisting of the five questions from §3 
was administered anonymously to 136 undergraduate engineer-
ing students in a classroom setting at the University of Central 
Florida. Respondents were asked to indicate their gender; no 
other demographic or background information was requested.  
One response was not at all usable. Of the 135 usable re-
sponses, 108 were provided by males and 27 were provided by 
females. Sixty-three of the responses (50 males, 13 females) were 
complete, contained only finite values for the payoff-matrix val-
ues, and appeared to be free of logical and mathematical anoma-
lies. From each one of these usable responses, a value of G* was 
calculated.  
Two responses (1 male, 1 female) were incomplete. Seven re-
sponses (6 males, 1 female) had logical flaws. An example would 
be a higher reward indicated for living a God-displeasing life 
than for living a God-pleasing life if God exists. Twenty-six re-
sponses (22 males, 4 females) resulted in an undefined value for 
G* (because the denominator in the calculation was zero). The 
other 37 responses (29 males, 8 females) included at least one 
payoff-matrix value that was infinite.  
The responses to the fifth question about the probability that 
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God exists ( Pr(G) ) are analyzed for the 135 usable responses. 
The breakeven probabilities (G*) calculated for the 63 complete, 
finite, and logical responses are analyzed as well. The responses 
of males and females are summarized separately and collec-
tively. The responses to the first four questions cannot be mean-
ingfully analyzed because all of the respondents were not meas-
uring their responses in the same units, such as dollars. Table 2 
presents summary statistics for the responses to the question 
about Pr(G) . For females, males, and all respondents, the table 
provides the number of responses, the sample average, the sam-
ple standard deviation, the maximum response value, the mini-
mum response value, and a 95% confidence interval for the 
population mean. In a few instances where the response was 
over 1 or 100%, the response was truncated to 1. It is interesting 
to note that 69 (54 males, 15 females) of the 135 respondents es-
timated Pr(G) to be 1 (or greater). Only three respondents (2 
males, 1 female) said that they believe there is no chance that 
God exists, that is, Pr(G) = 0.  
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Responses to the Probability of 
God’s Existence  
 Respondents   
Statistic  Females  Males  All  
Number  27  108  135  
Mean  0.814  0.774  0.782  
Std. Deviation  0.281  0.332  0.322  
Maximum  1  1  1  
Minimum  0  0  0  
95% CI for Mean  (0.708, 0.920)  (0.712,0.837)  (0.728,0.836)  
Table 3 shows the same summary statistics for the calculated 
values of G
*
 based on the 63 completely usable responses to the 
first four survey questions.  
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Statistic Females  Males  All  
Number Mean Std. 
Deviation Maxi-
mumMinimum95% 
CI for Mean  
13 0.154 
0.375 1 0 
(0,0.358)  
50 0.048 
0.182 1 0 
(0,0.098)  
63 0.070 0.235 1 
0 (0.013,0.126)  
There are 28 respondents (22 males, 6 females) for whom β 
>γ, meaning that they believe the rewards for living a God-
pleasing life exceed the rewards for living a God-displeasing life, 
even if God does not exist. There were no responses suggesting δ 
>α , meaning that all 63 respondents think that the rewards for 
living a God-pleasing life exceed the rewards for living a God-
displeasing life if God exists. Finally, for only 3 respondents (2 
males, 1 female) was G
* 
> Pr(G).  
Statistical tests were conducted to determine if there are any 
significant gender differences among the sample means and 
sample standard deviations for the responses for Pr(G) and the 
calculated values of G*. The only statistically significant gender 
difference is for the standard deviation of the G*
 
values. The 
standard deviation for females is found to be greater than the 
standard deviation for males at significance levels up to 10%.  
The results on the tests for gender differences are somewhat 
surprising in light of the findings of Miller and Hoffman. They 
found females to be more sensitive to risk when it comes to relig-
ious matters.11 If that were true for the survey respondents, then 
the standard deviation for the calculated G* values would likely 
be smaller, rather than larger, for females than it is for males. 
Additionally, more gender differences might have been ex-
pected. Since the sample of complete responses by females has 
only 13 observations, this unexpected result may be best attrib-
uted to a small sample size.  
It is expected that persons who think it is very likely that 
God exists would provide payoff-matrix values that would re-
sults in a rather low calculated value for G*. In other words, it is 
expected that there is an indirect relationship, i.e., a negative 
correlation, between the estimates for Pr(G) and the calculated 
values for G*. For males and females combined, this correlation is 
− 0.194. It is − 0.295 for the males and − 0.022 for the females.  
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Spiritual-Condition Diagnosis With Pascal’s Wager  
An informal survey may be a good way to collect data, but it 
alone is certainly not a good way to carry out the Great Commis-
sion (Matthew 28:18-20). The questions suggested in §3 may be 
used as part of a personal evangelism encounter where one-on-
one interaction allows for clarification of the questions and for 
detection and possibly correction of logical inconsistencies in 
responses. Additional questions about a person’s spiritual back-
ground (including church attendance, denomination, and expo-
sure to the Bible) would facilitate even better diagnosis of a per-
son’s spiritual condition.  
An important early step in personal evangelism is evaluat-
ing a person’s spiritual condition. For example, the FAITH pro-
gram uses one “key” question to diagnose a person’s spiritual 
condition.12 The Evangelism Explosion (EE) program suggests 
using two diagnostic questions, one to determine if a person be-
lieves that he or she has secured eternal life and another to de-
termine in what he or she is trusting (i.e., faith or works) for sal-
vation.13 The questions related to Pascal’s Wager may be used 
along with the FAITH key question or the EE questions to learn 
even more about a person’s spiritual condition.  
The question about the probability of God’s existence allows 
an interviewer or evangelist to determine whether the person 
recognizes God’s general revelation through nature, history, and 
humanity. Any response less than 1 or 100% is a sign of some 
doubt as to the existence of God. The smaller the response for 
Pr(G) is, the greater the doubt about the existence of God. For a 
person with significant doubt about the existence of God, it does 
not make sense to present the Gospel without first giving a clear 
indication of who God is and what He has done through His 
creation, sustenance, and providence.  
Thirty-eight of the 135 survey respondents, including 19 of 
those with completely usable responses to all five questions, said 
that they believe the probability that God exists is 0.5 or less. Be-
fore God’s plan of salvation could be expected to have much 
meaning to these 38, they would need greater knowledge of 
God.  
Assuming that a person is reasonably certain that God exists, 
it is important that he or she has a good understanding of what 
sin is and what its consequences are. Indications of a good un-
derstanding of sin and its consequences include α >> 0 and δ< 0, 
or α >>δ . In other words, a person with a good understanding of 
man’s sin problem ought to believe that there is a substantially 
greater payoff for living a God-pleasing life than for living a 
9
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God-displeasing life.  
From the completely usable responses to the survey, none of 
the 63 respondents indicated that α< 0 . However, two did re-
spond that α= 0 . There were only two of the usable responses 
that indicated that α =δ (including one who indicated that α =δ = 
0 ). Twenty-seven responded with negative values for δ ; another 
twenty-one indicated that δ= 0. That means that 15 of these re-
spondents seem to think there is some benefit for living a God-
displeasing life even if God exists.  
Finally, the third and fourth questions can be used to deter-
mine if the person believes there is greater reward for living a 
“God”-pleasing life rather than a “God”-displeasing life if God 
does not exist. The responses to these questions may indicate 
whether the person believes the claims of the Bible about the 
abundance and joy of the Christian life (John 10:10).  
Twenty-seven of the 63 respondents with completely usable 
responses indicated that they believe that β >γ , which implies 
that G*< 0 . Such persons may be saved, but at a minimum, 
should be interested in knowing more about God and His plan 
of salvation since in their cases Pr(G) > G*.  
For persons who have a limited knowledge of God or who 
do not believe strongly that He exists, a personal evangelism 
approach must begin with establishing an understanding of who 
God is. In such a case, evangelizing the person may entail a sig-
nificant commitment over a period of time. For persons with a 
reasonable understanding of who God is but who are not as 
clear about sin, a standard Gospel presentation, such as EE, 
FAITH, or the Evangecube,14 with good emphasis on sin and the 
need to repent is appropriate. Finally, a personal testimony or a 
NET15 presentation may be very effective for helping a person 
with relatively good understanding about God and sin to appre-
ciate the joy of living the Christian life.  
It is not possible with the survey responses alone to deter-
mine which respondents are Christians and which are not. How-
ever, it is clear that the questions based on Pascal’s Wager are 
helpful for diagnosing a person’s spiritual condition and identi-
fying an appropriate evangelism strategy. Reward units men-
tioned in some of the responses cannot be repeated here and 
probably would have pointed out good candidates for an evan-
gelism encounter had the survey responses not been anony-
mous. Those whose responses were not usable may include 
those most in need of an evangelistic encounter.  
Discussion  
The lepers in 2 Kings 7 decided they had nothing to lose by 
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venturing to the enemy’s camp. There they found that the camp 
of the Arameans had been abandoned because God had caused 
the Arameans to think that they were about to be attacked by a 
large army with horses and chariots. The Arameans left every-
thing behind, including food, drink, clothing, silver, gold, and 
horses. The lepers had their fill of food and drink and then de-
cided that they should return to Samaria and tell the king of 
their windfall discovery. So much was recovered from the camp 
of the Arameans that the famine in Samaria was ended. God had 
graciously provided relief for the lepers and for all of Samaria.  
Pascal wished to convey the message about God’s incredible 
grace, like that experienced by the lepers, to unbelievers of his 
day. He used an argument that he thought would appeal to his 
rational contemporaries. Pascal believed that no decision could 
be as rewarding as the decision to bet on God. The message is 
just as pertinent today that God “is able to do far more abun-
dantly beyond all that we ask or think” (Ephesians 3:20, NASB), 
just as He did for the lowly lepers. It seems that all they wanted 
was a meal. They made a step of faith into the unknown and 
were indeed blessed beyond their expectations. Pascal believed 
that faith in God brings rewards beyond anyone’s expectations.  
A series of questions based on Pascal’s Wager is recom-
mended for diagnosing a person’s spiritual condition and identi-
fying an appropriate evangelism approach. These questions, 
along with typical diagnostic questions, can lead to a more pre-
cise diagnosis of a person’s spiritual condition. With a more ac-
curate spiritual diagnosis, an evangelist can tailor a message to 
better meet the needs of the person being evangelized.  
The strategy suggested here may be helpful in reaching lost 
persons who have analytical or quantitative skills, like those 
Pascal had hoped to reach, with the Gospel message. Using Pas-
cal’s Wager or the questions presented here as part of an evan-
gelistic conversation may be more effective in reaching women 
than men because females are more risk-averse than males.16
 
In 
recent years, there has been much written about reaching lost 
people in a postmodern culture.171819 The present approach may 
appeal to postmodern persons because they are interactive and 
there are no right or wrong answers.20 Additionally, the discus-
sion of payoffs or rewards may be especially interesting for per-
sons with materialistic tendencies.  
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